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THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE RULE OF LAW: 
THE MASETHLA JUDGMENT, A CAUSE FOR CONCERN? 
 
R Krüger* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The facts of Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa1 remind one in 
some way of a James Bond story – instructions from on high led to covert 
surveillance and phone tapping, followed by copious investigations and filing of 
reports with high-ranking individuals. With the necessary background music, the 
scene could be set for the hero to save the day. 
 
Fortunately – or unfortunately – the judgments of the Constitutional Court in 
Masethla are less romantic than a Bond story, but they are no less dramatic. For 
constitutional lawyers, the judgments' specific pronouncements regarding the scope 
of the rule of law as a foundational constitutional concept are of great importance. 
The majority of the Court interpreted the rule of law narrowly, while the minority 
opted for a more inclusive interpretation incorporating procedural fairness as a 
constraint on the exercise of public power.  
 
This case note considers the Masethla judgment against the background of literature 
on the rule of law and earlier judgments of the Constitutional Court which relied on 
this concept. In the first instance, the note provides an overview of the Masethla 
case. 
                                               
*  Rósaan Krüger. BA(Hons) LLB PGDHE PhD. Senior lecturer, Faculty of Law, Rhodes University, 
South Africa (r.kruger@ru.ac.za).  
1  2008 1 BCLR 1 (CC). 
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2 Masethla: An overview 
 
2.1 Facts 
 
In December 2004, the President of the Republic of South Africa appointed Billy 
Lesedi Masethla the Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) for a 
fixed three-year term.2 His letter of appointment made specific reference to the 
Intelligence Services Act3 and the Public Service Act,4 but no contract to regulate the 
employment relationship of Masethla was ever concluded.5 Approximately twenty 
months after Masethla's appointment as head of the NIA, a surveillance scandal 
involving a prominent businessman was uncovered.6 Masethla was called to provide 
a formal account to the Minister of Intelligence Services (the Minister).7 In his report 
to the Minister, Masethla denied authorising the surveillance, placing the blame for 
the amateurish surveillance operation on the Deputy Director-General of the NIA.8 
However, Masethla's explanation was not accepted and the Minister instructed the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence Services to investigate the matter.9 The Inspector-
General's report portrayed Masethla as obstructing the investigation and he 
recommended disciplinary action against Masethla for failing to exercise his 
managerial and oversight duties properly.10 This report was forwarded to the 
President of South Africa and Masethla was called to a meeting with the President.11 
During the meeting, the parties discussed Masethla's role in attempting to dissuade 
the now-suspended Deputy Director-General from instituting legal proceedings to 
challenge his own suspension.12 The President, Masethla, the Minister and the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence Services attended a follow-up meeting the next 
day. However, rather than proceeding with the meeting, the President asked 
                                               
2  Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 7 – hereafter 
Masethla. 
3  65 of 2002. 
4  103 of 1994. 
5  Masethla para 55. 
6  Masethla para 7. 
7  Masethla para 7. 
8  Masethla para 10. 
9  Masethla para 10. 
10  Masethla para 11. 
11  Masethla para 13. 
12  Masethla para 13. 
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Masethla to listen to what the Minister had to say. The Minister read out a letter 
stating that Masethla had been suspended from his position as Director-General of 
the NIA. This letter was signed by the Minister and gave no indication that the 
decision to suspend Masethla was that of the President.13  
 
Following Masethla's delivery of court papers to challenge the decision to suspend 
him as unlawful, a Presidential Minute to record the President's decision to suspend 
Masethla was issued.14 Months later, Masethla sought to challenge the validity of the 
President's decision to suspend him. The founding papers for this application 
"carried attacks on the integrity of the President [… and] accused the President of 
lying".15 In response to the delivery of these papers, the President unilaterally 
amended Masethla's term of office to end within days of this amendment.16 The 
President explained that the trust relationship between Masethla and him had broken 
down irretrievably and that Masethla could therefore not continue in his position as 
the head of the NIA.17 Arrangements were made for Masethla to receive the full 
financial benefits of his appointment,18 but he refused to accept the payment that 
was made to him, maintaining that his initial suspension and effective dismissal 
happened in contravention of the law.  
 
The judgment of the Constitutional Court followed a further High Court application by 
Masethla to challenge the validity of the President's decision to amend his term of 
office unilaterally and to obtain a declaratory order to the effect that he was still the 
head of the NIA.19 He was unsuccessful in the High Court, hence his appeal to the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
This summary of the facts clearly indicates that there were several issues at stake in 
this matter. Time and space do not permit a detailed consideration of all these issues 
and their relation to one another. It is however necessary to explain why the rule of 
                                               
13  Masethla para 14. 
14  Masethla para 15. 
15  Masethla para 17. 
16  Masethla para 17. 
17  Masethla para 18. 
18  Masethla paras 18–20. 
19  Masethla para 21. 
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law was said to be at the root of this matter. The note discusses, first, the majority 
judgment penned by Moseneke DCJ, and then considers the dissent of Ngcobo J (as 
he was then known). The separate concurring judgment of Sachs J is not discussed. 
 
2.2 Majority judgment 
 
Section 209(2) of the Constitution provides that the President, as the head of the 
national executive, has to appoint the head of the each of the intelligence services 
and that he must assume political responsibility for the control and direction of these 
services, or that he may designate such responsibility. The legislation that regulates 
the different services and their operation is rooted in this section.20 According to 
Moseneke DCJ, the power to dismiss such an official is concomitant to the power to 
appoint such an official.21 When the President appoints or dismisses a head of one 
of the intelligence services, he exercises a public power that must be exercised "in a 
constitutionally valid manner".22 Masethla maintained that this required the President 
to adhere to the audi alteram partem principle by affording him a hearing before 
deciding to dismiss him. Moseneke DCJ23 noted that precedent has recognised that 
"the power to dismiss must ordinarily be constrained by the requirement of 
procedural fairness, which incorporates the right to be heard ahead of an adverse 
decision". However, the power that the President exercises is an executive power 
and the relationship between the President and the head of the NIA is a "special 
legal relationship" that requires particular consideration.24 This relationship is special 
since the head of the NIA plays a vital role in relation to the maintenance of national 
security.25 The exercise of executive power should not be constrained by the 
requirement of procedural fairness that is, according to the judge, the hallmark 
requirement of administrative action.26 Whilst maintaining that the exercise of the 
                                               
20  Masethla para 35.  
21  Masethla paras 39, 64 and 68. 
22  Masethla para 63. 
23  Masethla para 75. 
24  Masethla paras 75 and 76. 
25  Masethla para 32. 
26  Masethla para 77: "It is clear that the Constitution and the legislative scheme give the President a 
special power to appoint and that it will be only reviewable on narrow grounds and constitutes 
executive action and not administrative action. The power to dismiss – being a corollary of the 
power to appoint – is similarly executive action that does not constitute administrative action, 
particularly in this special category of appointments. It would not be appropriate to constrain 
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power to dismiss the head of the NIA was not subject to the requirement of 
procedural fairness, Moseneke DCJ added that even if that were a requirement, 
Masethla had several opportunities to state his case at the various meetings he had 
with the Minister, the Inspector-General and the President.27 The finding that 
procedural fairness did not constrain the exercise of this power did not leave 
Moseneke DCJ to conclude that the power was without constitutional limits. The 
exercise of this executive power was, in the view of the judge, constrained by the 
principle of legality and by the requirement of rationality.28 It appears therefore that 
the judge was of the view that procedural fairness exists as a constraint separate 
from legality and rationality. This distinction will be discussed at a later stage in the 
note. 
 
Legality, an implicit principle in our constitutional ordering, requires the President, 
according to the Moseneke DCJ, to act "in accordance with the law and in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution."29 This means that the power conferred "must not be 
misconstrued".30 It was established that the President had the power to dismiss the 
head of the NIA. In the view of the judge, the legality constraint was thus adhered to. 
The second constraint of rationality requires the decision to be rationally related to 
the purpose for which the power was given.31 National security interests require the 
President to be able to subjectively trust the head of the NIA.32 This trust relationship 
was of utmost importance and its irretrievable breakdown was a rational basis for the 
decision of dismissal.33 The rationality requirement was thus also met. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
executive power to requirements of procedural fairness, which is a cardinal feature in reviewing 
administrative action. These powers to appoint and to dismiss are conferred specially upon the 
President for the effective business of government and, in this particular case, for the effective 
pursuit of national security." See also para 75. 
27  Masethla para 83. 
28  Masethla para 78. 
29  Masethla para 81. 
30  Masethla para 81. 
31  Masethla para 81. 
32  Masethla para 86. 
33  Masethla para 86. 
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Moseneke DCJ was satisfied that the rule of law had not been breached and the 
appeal failed. Six judges of the Constitutional Court concurred in the judgment of 
Moseneke DCJ.34 
 
2.3 Minority judgment 
 
The minority judgment of Ngcobo J35 stands in sharp contrast to the majority 
judgment, particularly on the issue of procedural fairness as a requirement of the rule 
of law. Ngcobo J agreed with Moseneke DCJ that the power to remove or dismiss 
the head of the NIA was incidental to the power to appoint this official.36 His 
argument in respect of the constraints that limit this power was that one of these 
constraints on the exercise of public power is the foundational value of the rule of 
law.37 The rule of law requires legality, that is, that public power be exercised in 
compliance with the law and within the boundaries set by the law.38 The rule of law 
further requires rational and non-arbitrary exercise of power.39 The non-arbitrariness 
requirement means that there must be a rational connection between the exercise of 
power and the purpose for which that power was given. Ngcobo J then stated: "[t]he 
crisp question for decision is whether the rule of law, in particular, the doctrine of 
legality, has a procedural component".40 Ngcobo J held that non-arbitrariness in the 
rule of law "refers to a wider concept and deeper principle: fundamental fairness".41 
He linked the rule of law as a founding value with the founding values of 
accountability, openness and responsibility. Adherence to these values is only 
possible when there is participation in decision-making.42  
                                               
34  The judges who concurred were Langa CJ, Navsa AJ, Nkabinde J, O'Regan J, Skweyiya J and 
Van der Westhuizen J. 
35  Madala J concurred in this judgment.  
36  Masethla para 167. 
37  Masethla para 173. 
38  Masethla para 173. 
39  Masethla paras 173–176. 
40  Masethla para 178. 
41  Masethla para 179. 
42  Masethla paras 181–182. 
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Ngcobo J held that the non-arbitrariness requirement of the rule of law: 
 
has both a procedural and substantive component. Rationality deals with the 
substantive component, the requirement that the decision must be rationally 
related to the purpose for which the power was given and the existence of a 
lawful reason for the action taken. The procedural component is concerned 
with the manner in which the decision was taken. It imposes an obligation on 
the decision-maker to act fairly. To hold otherwise would result in executive 
decisions which have been arrived at by a procedure which was clearly 
unfair being immune for review.43 
 
In the view of the judge, fundamental fairness requires adherence to the audi alteram 
partem principle, since this minimises arbitrariness in the exercise of power.44 What 
is fair, and more particularly, what is procedurally fair, will be determined in the 
context of a specific case.45 In this particular case, the President would have been 
able to terminate the contract of the head of the NIA for a lawful reason and in 
accordance with fair procedures that would "at a bare minimum, entail informing the 
head of the department of the proposed action and the reasons for it and allowing 
the head of department to comment on these matters".46 This was not done; the 
President was of the view that the trust relationship had broken down irretrievably 
and he acted unilaterally on that view without complying with the demands of 
fairness.47 On this interpretation of the rule of law, procedural fairness is a firm 
requirement; in a case in which the rights of a person may potentially be adversely 
affected by a decision, that person has a right to make representations to the 
decision-maker before the decision is made. The extent of procedural fairness 
required will be determined by the particular case. 
 
The minority and majority judgments of the Masethla case clearly demonstrate that 
disagreement exists on the scope and the requirements of the rule of law. South 
African judges are not unique in their disagreement about the rule of law. Legal 
                                               
43  Masethla para 184. 
44  Masethla paras 184 and 187. 
45  Masethla para 190. 
46  Masethla para 195. 
47  Masethla para 202–204. 
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scholar, Tamanaha,48 echoing an earlier somewhat harsher comment by Shklar,49 
states: 
 
Disagreement exists about what the rule of law means among casual users 
of the phrase, among government officials, and among theorists. The danger 
of this rampant uncertainty is that the rule of law might devolve to an empty 
phrase, so lacking in meaning that it can be proclaimed with impunity by 
malevolent governments. 
 
What are we to make of this uncertainty? Should the rule of law be interpreted 
narrowly to exclude procedural fairness, or should we construe this constitutional 
ideal and practical constraint mechanism more widely to require adherence to 
fundamental fairness in the exercise of all public power? 
 
In order to make sense of the competing interpretations of the rule of law in the 
Masethla judgment and to assess the impact of these interpretations on the overall 
understanding of this concept in South African constitutional law, it is necessary to 
consider the different theories of the rule of law and the earlier interpretation of the 
concept by the South African Constitutional Court. 
 
3 Rule of law theories 
 
Tamanaha50 helpfully outlines rule of law theories on a continuum, with formal 
theories on the one side of the spectrum, and substantive theories on the other.  
 
Formal rule of law theories    Substantive rule of law theories 
Thinnest >-------------------->-------------------->--------------------> Thickest 
                                               
48  Rule of Law 114. 
49  "Political theory and the rule of law": "It would not be very difficult to show that the phrase 'the 
Rule of Law' has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use. It may 
well have become just another one of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace the 
public utterances of Anglo-American politicians." See also Raz 1977 LQR 195–196 and Allan 
Law, Liberty and Justice 20. 
50  Rule of Law 91. The diagram is an adaptation of the one by Tamanaha Rule of Law 91. See also 
Craig 1997 Public Law 467. Radin 1989 BULR 781–783 refers to "instrumentalist" and 
"substantive" conceptions of the rule of law. These largely coincide with the "formal" and 
"substantive" versions discussed. Fallon 1997 Columbia LR 5 ff distinguishes between four "ideal 
types" of the rule of law, namely the historicist, formalist, legal process and substantive types. 
The latter three ideal types mirror the formal to substantive continuum. See also Mathews "The 
rule of law – a reassessment" 294. 
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Formal rule of law conceptions focus on the procedure or manner of the 
promulgation of laws and do not set any requirements for the content of laws.51 The 
most basic form (or "thinnest" form, according to Tamanaha) of the formal 
conception of the rule of law requires that governmental action should be backed by 
law or, stated differently, that government should only act through laws.52 This "thin" 
understanding of the rule of law allows any government, however authoritarian or 
abusive of human rights, to claim compliance with the rule of law so long as their 
authoritarian or abusive actions are sanctioned by law. Such an understanding of the 
rule of law contributes little, if anything, to the restraint of abuse of power, which is 
generally regarded as the purpose that the rule of law is meant to serve.53  
 
A more enhanced (or "thicker") formal version of the rule of law is that of formal 
legality. The rule of law in this guise requires laws to be public, general, clear, 
prospective in their application and relatively stable.54 One of the foremost 
proponents of the rule of law as legality is Raz. Raz55 views compliance with the rule 
of law as one of the many ideals or virtues that a legal system may possess, and he 
adds that this ideal may be realised to a greater or lesser extent within each 
jurisdiction. Raz56 identifies eight principles of the rule of law as a formal concept that 
are very similar to those listed above. The rule of law requires open, clear, stable, 
general rules that must be applied without preference by independent courts. These 
principles have several practical legal implications. They require, in the first instance, 
exercise of public power within the framework of the law. In a case in which power is 
exercised ultra vires, the official exercising of that power is in breach of the rule of 
                                               
51  Tamanaha Rule of Law 91–92; Craig 1997 Public Law 469. 
52  Tamanaha Rule of Law 92. 
53  Hutchinson and Monahan "Introduction" ix. See also Jowell "The rule of law today" 5, 19. 
54 Raz 1977 LQR 198ff; Tamanaha Rule of Law 93; Craig 1997 Public Law 469; Fuller The Morality 
of Law 41. 
55  1977 LQR 196, see also 204. 
56  1977 LQR 198–201 lists the following principles: "(1) laws should be prospective, open and clear; 
(2) laws should be relatively stable; (3) the making of particular laws (legal orders) should be 
guided by open, clear, general rules; (4) the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 
(5) the principles of natural justice must be observed; (6) courts should have review powers over 
the implementation of the principles of the rule of law in respect of administrative action and 
legislation; (7) courts should be easily accessible; and (9) the discretion of law enforcement 
agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law." Raz notes that principles (1) to (3) set 
standards and that principles (4) to (8) provide for the machinery to implement those standards. 
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law.57 However, the rule of law as legality may mean more than merely acting within 
the scope of allocated power.  
 
The rule of law, Raz58 says, "is often rightly contrasted with arbitrary power". As 
such, it prevents retroactive or secret law-making by the legislature and the use of 
power for personal gain by the executive (for example nepotism), and it requires 
adherence to court procedures.59 For Raz,60 the non-arbitrariness aspect of the rule 
of law does not involve a consideration of the link between the exercise of power and 
the purpose meant to be served by the exercise of power. Such a consideration 
involves an interrogation of the subjective state of mind of the person exercising the 
power, which, according to Raz,61 is not what the rule of law as a formal concept 
requires. In those instances in which the rationality of the exercise of power is 
interrogated as explained, the rule of law is interpreted to set context-specific 
substantive standards.62 Such an interrogation requires a court to identify the 
purpose of the exercise of power and to determine whether such a purpose is 
constitutionally defensible. This requires a consideration of contextual and other 
factors, including, for example, the protection of specific human rights. For Raz, such 
a consideration falls outside the scope of the rule of law as a formal concept. 
 
The rule of law as formal legality concerns itself with the manner, form and 
procedures of law, as indicated above. The principles of natural justice, which are 
generally understood to inform this view of the rule of law, require the application of 
law in "open and fair hearing(s)" and the absence of bias on the part of the decision-
maker (the judge).63 A person tried in a court of law has the right to state his or her 
case before judgment is delivered. This requirement of procedural fairness as an 
aspect of legality has not been restricted to court proceedings.64 It is generally 
accepted that the rule of law requires compliance with this principle in relation to 
administrative decision-making. In a case in which the right to procedural fairness is 
                                               
57  Jowell "The rule of law today" 19. 
58  1977 LQR 202. 
59  Raz 1977 LQR 203. 
60  1977 LQR 203. 
61  1977 LQR 203. See Tamanaha Rule of Law 94. 
62  Tamanaha Rule of Law 94. See also Fallon 1997 Columbia LR 30–32. 
63  Raz 1977 LQR 201. 
64  Allan Law, Liberty and Justice 28–29. 
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extended to executive decision-making, it has been accepted that the facts of the 
particular case will determine the extent of the required procedural fairness.65 When 
this is done, legality is extended to allow for context-specific considerations to 
determine the scope of the rule of law,66 which means a move towards a more 
substantive interpretation of the rule of law.  
 
In the main, the rule of law as formal legality focuses on the ability of law to guide 
behaviour of people in society.67 As such, the rule of law is testament to valuing 
people as autonomous agents with the ability to make their own decisions.68 Should 
the rationality requirement extend beyond the scope intended by Raz and should 
context-specific considerations be brought into the fold of the rule of law, one's 
interpretation of the rule of law is "thicker" and it moves in the direction of a 
substantive interpretation of this concept. Viewed as formal legality, as Raz and his 
supporters propose, the rule of law says nothing about the content of laws and does 
not take context-specific considerations into account.  
 
The last formal conception of the rule of law, and "thicker" than those previously 
discussed, is the conception of the rule of law as requiring legality and democracy.69 
On this interpretation, the rule of law requires that people must consent to the laws 
that regulate their lives and that they must do so through the democratic process.70 
This view of the rule of law is limited by its focus on the manner in which law is 
passed and the legitimation of law through the democratic process. Democracy does 
not ensure "good" or just laws.71 
 
Substantive rule of law theories include aspects of the formal theories, such as 
legality, but place additional emphasis on various content requirements for law.72 
The most basic (or "thinnest") substantive theory requires the content of laws to 
                                               
65  Jowell "The rule of law today" 17. 
66  Tamanaha Rule of Law 120. 
67  Raz 1977 LQR 203; Tamanaha Rule of Law 94–96. 
68  Raz 1977 LQR 204; Tamanaha Rule of Law 96; Craig 1997 Public Law 469. 
69  Tamanaha Rule of Law 91, 99–100. For a criticism of this conceptualisation of the "rule of law as 
the butler of democracy", see Hutchinson and Monahan "Democracy and the Rule of Law" 97. 
70  Tamanaha Rule of Law 100. 
71  Tamanaha Rule of Law 100–101. 
72  Tamanaha Rule of Law 102. 
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protect individual rights.73 Further on the scale, and closer to the view that the rule of 
law requires the full realisation of the socio-economic welfare of people (the 
"thickest" substantive theory),74 is the conceptualisation of the rule of law requiring 
the actualisation of justice through commitment to the right to dignity.75 This view of 
the rule of law casts its net wide; compliance with the rule of law requires legality, 
democracy and laws that are just. Substantive theories of the rule of law that set 
content standards for laws in requiring the protection of certain rights do not account 
for the reality that rights are by their very nature contested and anti-democratic, since 
it requires unelected judges to interpret rights authoritatively.76  
 
Against this background of the spectrum of theories of the rule of law, the note 
considers earlier interpretations of the rule of law by the South African Constitutional 
Court. Thereafter, the note returns to the Masethla judgment in relation to both the 
theories and earlier judgments. 
 
4 The rule of law in South Africa 
 
Prior to 1994, the rule of law in South Africa was in fact the rule by law.77 Legality, as 
part of the rule of law, required government to act through law, that the actions of 
officials were intra vires and that arbitrary actions on the part of officials were 
prohibited.78 Legality in the common law was narrowly construed as a constraint on 
administrative action and it did not reflect a broad normative commitment to the rule 
of law in the substantive sense.79 The advent of constitutional democracy has 
changed all of this; constitutional supremacy replaced parliamentary sovereignty80 
and the supreme constitution introduced a justiciable bill of rights.81 In addition to 
this, Section 1(c) of the Constitution lists "supremacy of the constitution and the rule 
                                               
73  Tamanaha Rule of Law 91, 102–103. 
74  Tamanaha Rule of Law 91, 112–113. 
75  Tamanaha Rule of Law 91, 110–112.  
76  Tamanaha Rule of Law 103. See also Raz 1977 LQR 195–196. 
77  Baxter Administrative Law 77. 
78  Michelman "The rule of law, legality and supremacy of the Constitution" 11–1; Hoexter 
Administrative Law 116 and see also Baxter Administrative Law 301. 
79  Baxter Administrative Law 78. 
80  S 2 Constitution. 
81  Chp 2 Constitution. 
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of law" among the founding values of the sovereign, democratic South African 
state.82  
 
What role do founding values – and specifically the rule of law – play in constitutional 
adjudication? In the United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of 
South Africa,83 the Court held in respect of Section 1: 
 
[t]hese founding values have an important place in our Constitution. They 
inform the interpretation of the Constitution and other law, and set positive 
standards with which all law must comply in order to be valid.84  
 
In a subsequent judgment, the Court confirmed the importance of the foundational 
values but added that the values "do not, however, give rise to discrete and 
enforceable rights in themselves".85 This, according to the Court, was clear from the 
language used in Section 1 and the structure of the Constitution, which contains a 
Bill of Rights protecting specific rights.86 Founding values, including the rule of law, 
are thus to inform the interpretation of all legal provisions.87 While the use of values-
based interpretation is preferred to the strict literalist interpretation that dominated in 
South Africa prior to 1994,88 values-based interpretation is not per se uncontroversial 
or easy.89 Values "serve as reasons for rules" and "rules (if they are any good) serve 
                                               
82  S 1 Constitution reads as follows: "The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic 
state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. (c) Supremacy 
of the constitution and the rule of law. (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, 
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness." 
83  1 2002 11 BCLR 1179 (CC) – hereafter United Democratic Movement. 
84  United Democratic Movement para 19. 
85  Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of 
Offenders (NICRO) 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC); 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) para 21 – hereafter NICRO. 
See also Henderson 1998 SALJ 215–216 and Roederer "Founding provisions" Chp 13, 13-29. 
86  NICRO para 21. This view of the structure of the Constitution demanding interpretation and 
application of the Bill of Rights is supported by Woolman. See Woolman 2007 SALJ 762–763. 
See also Roederer "Founding provisions" 13–30, who reads Michelman to interpret the CC's rule 
of law jurisprudence as espousing "a right to legality". 
87  Roederer "Founding provisions" 13-3–13-8 is of the view that the Constitution also has extra-
textual founding provisions, eg the values of ubuntu and transformation. A further constitutional 
directive for values-based interpretation can be found in S 39(2). 
87 For criticism of this approach, see Dugard 1971 SALJ 181. Values-based interpretation or 
purposive interpretation is generally hailed by commentators as a positive feature of the new 
dispensation. See for example Devenish The South African Constitution 199–213. 
89  See for example the remarks of Kentridge AJ in the first judgment of the Constitutional Court, S v 
Zuma 1995 4 BCLR 401 (CC); 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) paras 15–18. See also Kroeze 2001 Stell LR 
265. 
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to implement values".90 In elaborating on the framework of values that underpin the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court has stated that the Constitution embodies an 
"objective, normative value system".91 This "objective, normative value system" 
includes, but is not limited to, the founding values that are set out in Section 1.92 How 
has the Court interpreted the rule of law within this framework?  
 
A review of the Constitutional Court's rule of law jurisprudence reveals that the Court 
combines formal and substantive interpretations of the concept, while still retaining 
the emphasis on a formal interpretation.93 In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd,94 the 
Constitutional Court held that the rule of law in the form of legality was implicit in the 
interim Constitution.95 The text of that Constitution did not refer to the rule of law or 
legality explicitly.96 Legality was interpreted to mean that "the legislature and 
executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may exercise no 
power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law".97 This 
interpretation of legality requiring officials to act within the four corners of the law was 
                                               
90  Michelman "The rule of law, legality and supremacy of the Constitution" 11–35. 
91  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC); 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 
54. Subsequent judgments have repeated this notion of the existence of such a value system: 
Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 2004 10 BCLR 1009 (CC); 2005 4 SA 235 
(CC) para 218 (hereafter Kaunda), per O'Regan; Thebus v S 2003 10 BCLR 1100 (CC); 2003 6 
SA 505 (CC) paras 27–28, K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 9 BCLR 835 (CC) para 15; 
Masethla para 183, per Ngcobo J; Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; 
Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2008 12 BCLR 1197 (CC) para 375, per Ngcobo 
J.  
92  Roederer "Founding provisions" 139–13-10 states as follows: "While no case has yet outlined the 
parameters of this concept, a number of cases have drawn from the 'grab-bag' of values found 
within this 'system'. … What is clear is that the notion of an 'objective normative value system' 
functions, like the founding values, as a measuring standard for all governmental conduct; as a 
set of values that influence the interpretation of the Final Constitution, the Bill of Rights and other 
legislation; and as a set of values that influences both whether and how the common law is to be 
developed." 
93  An indication of the Court's emphasis on a formal interpretation of the rule of law can be gleaned 
from Sachs J's remark in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 
(CC) para 35: "Rather than envisage the foundational values of the rule of law and the 
achievement of equality as being distinct from and in tension with each other, PIE [the Prevention 
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998] treats these values as 
interactive, complementary and mutually reinforcing." The judge seems to imply that "rule of law" 
has to do with formalities, and "the achievement of equality" with content. 
94  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 12 
BCLR 1458 (CC); 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) – hereafter Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd. 
95  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd paras 58–59.  
96  Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
97  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v para 58. 
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confirmed by the Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association98 and 
Affordable Medicines Trust.99 A further facet of the rule of law as formal legality was 
highlighted in the judgment of Dawood,100 in which the Court noted that the rule of 
law required laws to be stated in a clear and accessible manner.101 This was 
subsequently confirmed in the Affordable Medicines Trust102 and Kruger103 
judgments.  
 
A more substantive interpretation of the rule of law is evident from the Court's 
interpretation of rationality and non-arbitrariness as aspects of this foundational 
value. The discussion of the theory above indicated that Raz insists on a narrow 
interpretation of this requirement, which only proscribes clear, baseless exercise of 
power for personal gain as arbitrary. The South African Constitutional Court has 
opted for a somewhat "thicker" interpretation of the rationality requirement. In New 
National Party v Government of South Africa,104 the Court identified rationality as the 
first constraint in relation to Parliament's power to pass legislation.105 This requires 
that there "must be a rational relationship between the scheme which it [Parliament] 
adopts and the achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose".106 In this 
judgment, the Court identified the purpose to be served by the legislation as 
constitutionally defensible with reference to the voting rights protected in Chapter 2 
of the Constitution. As such, the rationality consideration incorporated substantive 
standards set by a specific right. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the 
Court explained the requirement of rationality and non-arbitrariness somewhat 
differently. Rationality, the minimum requirement for the exercise of any public 
                                               
98  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC); 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) paras 19–20, 44, 50 – 
hereafter Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. 
99  Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC); 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) 
paras 48–50 – hereafter Affordable Medicines Trust. 
100  Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 8 BCLR 837 (CC); 2000 3 SA 936 
(CC) – hereafter Dawood. 
101  Dawood para 47. 
102  Affordable Medicines Trust para 108. 
103  Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 1 SA 417 (CC) paras 64–67. 
104  1999 5 BCLR 489 (CC); 1999 3 SA 191 (CC) – hereafter New National Party. 
105  New National Party para 19. 
106  New National Party para 19. This interpretation was followed in United Democratic Movement 
para 55, Kaunda para 78 (here the Court also mentioned exercise of power in bad faith). See 
also Affordable Medicines Trust paras 74–75. 
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power,107 requires, according to the Court, an objectively assessed rational 
relationship between the exercise of power on the one hand, and the purpose for 
which the power was given on the other hand.108 In the absence of such a rational 
relationship, the exercise of power is irrational, arbitrary and thus unlawful. This 
enquiry requires the Court to determine the purpose for which power was conferred 
without necessarily considering specific rights or the standards set by specific rights. 
This determination still requires the consideration of substantive standards in relation 
to a particular context, such as, for example, public health and the regulation of 
medical substances as in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.109 While this 
consideration does not require the Court to determine the standards imposed by 
specific rights, it nonetheless requires the Court to consider substantive standards 
relevant to the particular context. 
  
In those instances in which the consideration of procedural fairness is a requirement 
of the rule of law, the Court has opted for a context-sensitive, thus more substantive, 
interpretation of the rule of law. This is evident from the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v South African 
Rugby Football Union.110 The Court made it clear that the power of the President to 
appoint a commission of enquiry was constrained by, inter alia, legality and the fact 
that the President is to act in good faith and that he is not to misconstrue his 
powers.111 In elaborating on the constitutional constraints, the Court held: 
 
The requirement of procedural fairness, which is an incident of natural 
justice, though relevant to hearings before tribunals, is not necessarily 
relevant to every exercise of public power. … What procedural fairness 
requires depends on the circumstances of each particular case.112 
 
A few of the Court's judgments also comment on the link between the rule of law and 
specific human rights, which is indicative of a more substantive interpretation of this 
                                               
107  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association para 90. 
108  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association para 85.  
109  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association paras 60–88. 
110  1999 10 BCLR 1059 (CC); 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) – hereafter SARFU. 
111  SARFU para 148. 
112  SARFU para 219. 
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value as discussed above. In Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank,113 
Mokgoro J held that the principle against self-help is an aspect of the rule of law.114 
Legislation that allows self-help does thus not contravene the right of access to court 
alone, but also violates "a deeper principle ... under[lying] our democratic order".115 
In Modderklip,116 this link was confirmed,117 and perhaps even developed by Langa 
ACJ: 
 
The obligation on the state [imposed by the rule of law and the right of 
access to court] goes further than the mere provision of the mechanisms and 
institutions [for dispute resolution] referred to above. It is also obliged to take 
reasonable steps, where possible, to ensure that large-scale disruptions in 
the social fabric do not occur in the wake of the execution of court orders, 
thus undermining the rule of law. The precise nature of the state's obligation 
in any particular case and in respect of any particular right will depend on 
what is reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the right or interest that 
is at risk as well as on the circumstances of each case.118 
 
It is noteworthy that the Constitutional Court's substantive interpretation of the rule of 
law has focused on the right of access to court and the law as a dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
 
This overview of the Court's interpretation of the rule of law demonstrates that the 
Court applies this founding value as a formal constraint in some instances and as 
setting content standards in others. At a minimum, the Court has viewed the rule of 
law as requiring the exercise of power to be intra vires. The Court's interpretation of 
the rule of law as setting substantive standards is multifaceted. This is evident from 
its determination that the rule of law requires rationality and non-arbitrariness and 
procedural fairness as determined by context, and by the direct connection it has 
identified between the rule of law and the right of access to court. 
 
                                               
113  1999 12 BCLR 1420 (CC); 2000 1 SA 409 (CC) – hereafter Chief Lesapo. 
114  Chief Lesapo paras 1, 11. 
115  Chief Lesapo para 16. See also paras 17, 19. See also Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local 
Government Affairs 2005 4 BCLR 347 (CC); 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) para 82. 
116  President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC) 
– hereafter Modderklip. 
117  Modderklip para 39. 
118  Modderklip para 43. 
R KRÜGER              PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
485/508 
 
Where does Masethla fit in? Is the majority judgment in accordance with earlier 
pronouncements and is it defensible considering the context of the particular matter? 
 
5 Masethla: analysis 
 
Moseneke DCJ's interpretation of the rule of law is narrower (and more positivistic) 
than that of his colleague, Ngcobo J. The point of departure for both judges was that 
of legality in that the President could only exercise a power conferred upon him by 
law. Both judges held that the power to dismiss was incidental to the power to 
appoint. This formal interpretation of the rule of law is in accordance with the Court's 
earlier pronouncements on this concept. However, when it came to the consideration 
of further, more substantive constraints imposed by the rule of law, the judges parted 
ways.  
 
Moseneke DCJ's interpretation of rationality as an aspect of the rule of law included 
both formal and substantive elements, combining these aspects in a way not 
dissimilar to previous interpretations by the Court. For Moseneke DCJ, the 
requirement of rationality meant that a rational connection must exist between the 
exercise of power and the purpose for which that power was given. But an important 
consideration for the judge was the nature of the power exercised; and herein is the 
difficulty with this judgment. Moseneke DCJ's judgment can be read to exclude 
procedural fairness in all respects of the exercise of all executive powers. It is true 
that Moseneke DCJ relied on the context of national security in coming to his 
conclusion, but in doing so, he repeatedly stated that the executive power of the 
President was constrained only by legality and rationality; constraints which in his 
view excluded the procedural fairness requirement. In the view of Moseneke DCJ, 
legality, rationality and procedural fairness are separate from one another as 
constraints on the exercise of power. This approach does not accord with the earlier 
pronouncements of the Court and could, if not read in context and with care, set a 
perilous precedent reducing the constraints on the exercise of executive power 
significantly and potentially eroding the supremacy of the Constitution in that respect.  
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Ngcobo J held that procedural fairness is a fundamental requirement of legality and 
thus the rule of law in respect of the exercise of all public power. The extent of 
procedural fairness required is determined on a case-by-case basis. The President 
failed to adhere to the requirements of procedural fairness in this instance and, 
consequently, his exercise of power fell short of the constitutional standard. This 
interpretation accords with the approach in SARFU and does not exempt the 
exercise of executive power by the President from the requirement of procedural 
fairness in all instances. Ngcobo J's interpretation allows for an interpretation of the 
rule of law in harmony with the other foundational values of accountability, openness 
and responsiveness and is, in my view, to be preferred to a limited interpretation of 
the rule of law that places the minimum of constraints on the exercise of executive 
power. 
 
Before concluding, it is important to mention the context relating to national security 
that informed both judgments. National security concerns fall within the domain of 
the executive and it is generally accepted that the executive should be given a 
relatively free reign in its decisions relating to such concerns.119 However, this does 
not mean that national security issues are exempt from constitutional standards or 
judicial scrutiny for compliance with such standards.120 The exercise of all public 
power is subject to constitutional constraints. The facts and context of a particular 
case may demand tailoring of those constraints. Should the facts of a case concern 
particular aspects of national security, the executive is to place adequate information 
before the court to enable it to determine the extent of the constraints that exist in 
relation to the exercise of power concerning national security issues.121 
 
                                               
119  See, for example, the remark of Lord Parker of Waddington in The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77 107: 
"Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of what the national 
security requires." See also Council of Civil Service Unions v the United Kingdom [1987] ECHR 
34 and Jowell "The rule of law today" 17. 
120  See Arden 2007 SALJ 57, 61 and 69, in which the author is at pains to demonstrate that 
constraints exist that limit the exercise of executive and legislative authority with regard to 
national security issues. 
121  Arden 2007 SALJ 73–75. In cases in which a clash between national security interests and 
human rights arises, the author proposes that courts engage in a proportionality analysis by 
considering national security interests (supported by adequate information) on the one hand, and 
the rights of individuals on the other. 
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In Masethla's case, both Moseneke DCJ and Ngcobo J considered national security 
interests generally without interrogating specific aspects of this notoriously 
complicated and complex concept.122 The facts of the matter demanded a broad 
consideration of the concept only, as it concerned the subjective trust relationship 
between the head of the NIA and the President rather than a particular aspect of 
national security. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The Constitutional Court has interpreted the rule of law as a foundational value to 
place important formal and substantive constraints on the exercise of all public 
power. The majority judgment of the Court in Masethla could be read to restrict the 
rule of law significantly. Future interpreters of this judgment should take adequate 
notice of the context within which the judgment was given so as not to reduce the 
rule of law to a minimal constraint on the exercise of executive power. The rule of 
law as a foundational value means more than that in the South African constitutional 
democracy. 
                                               
122  On the complexity of the concept, see Forcese 2006 Alberta LR 963, 965–967.  
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